Introduction
Even though there is a general consensus regarding the crucial role of financial systems for economic development, important areas of disagreement still persist, namely, the type of financial system most conducive to growth, private vs public ownership of financial institutions, the degree of regulation and supervision, the role of financial innovations and the optimum pace and extent of financial liberalization. The Latin American crises of the 1980s and 1990s, the Asian financial crisis and the current global recession have once again brought the critical role of financial institutions under the scanner and introduced some important caveats to this consensus. The present paper aims to take stock of some of these issues primarily in the South Asian context but also includes a brief discussion on Southeast Asia for comparative purposes. While it is certainly not being claimed that the Asian experience is representative of emerging market economies (EMEs) in general, it is nevertheless felt that some of the lessons drawn here, would have some relevance transcending their immediate context. Tables I and II present the gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates and inflation, respectively, for the major countries of South and Southeast Asia over the period [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] . The general pattern for the two regions is remarkably uniform -a modest interruption to the pre-crisis growth trajectory in the crisis years 2008 and 2009, followed by a robust resumption of growth in 2010. Most countries in Table I display a typical U-shaped growth trajectory over the period considered, except Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Singapore where the trajectory is more aptly described as V-shaped. As seen in Table II , the strong rebound in post-crisis growth has been accompanied in most countries by a sharp up-turn in inflation.
The global crisis originating from a financial crisis in the USA (and later Europe) has impacted other regions of the world through five primary channels:
(1) Declining trade volumes through lower export demand (trade channel); see Baldwin and Simon (2009) .
(2) Contamination of balance sheets of financial institutions via exposure to toxic assets of US and European Union (EU) banks (financial contagion channel); see Kollmann and Malherbe (2011) .
(3) Liquidity constraints and greater volatility in the capital and foreign exchange markets (asset markets channel); see Bates and Vaugirard (2009 South and Southeast Asia (2007-2011) 190 SAJGBR 1,2 (4) Pressure on private consumption through reduction in migrants' remittances, declining commodity prices and worsening job market conditions (consumption channel); see UNIDO (2009) .
(5) Undermining of domestic investment opportunities through massive reversal of private foreign capital inflows (investment channel); see Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2010) .
The robust growth in Asia in the decade following the Asian crisis -a growth largely uninterrupted by the USA slowdown in the wake of the dot.com bust of 2000 has led a number of researchers (e.g. Akin and Kose, 2007; Willett et al., 2011, etc.) to examine the hypothesis that several of the larger EMEs, especially in Asia, have decoupled from the developed western economies. Decoupling implies a progressively declining dependence of a few large EMEs on the macro-economic evolution of the advanced economies. A similar phenomenon was also in evidence during the recent global crisis.
In this paper, we try to understand the reasons behind the relative insulation of the Asian region from the worst consequences of the recent crisis and the set of macroeconomic policies (including a combination of monetary, fiscal and macro-prudential policies) that helped the region tide over the crisis, well before global recovery set in (see Reddy, 2011, p. 45) . The plan of our paper is as follows. This introductory section is followed by a discussion of the macro-economic management in four major countries of South Asia (namely, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka). The subsequent section turns to the macro-economic responses to the crisis in selected countries of Southeast Asia, highlighting parallels and contrasts with the South Asian case. A benchmarking of the regulatory and supervisory architecture currently obtaining in South Asia against certain desirable norms suggested at various international forums is attempted in the next section. Conclusions and recommendations have been gathered in the final section.
2. Macro-economic management in South Asia I. India Indian macro-policy was put to one of its severest tests by the recent global financial crisis. Though all the five transmission channels of global shocks identified above were operative in the early phase of the crisis, it was only the trade and investment channels which had significant and persistent impacts (see Kumar, 2009; Reddy, 2011, etc.) . As global incomes plummeted, exports growth declined from a robust level of 28. The Indian policy response to the global crisis was built upon three overriding considerations, namely, revival sans stagflation; erecting firewalls around the financial sector; and ensuring safety nets for the vulnerable sections. The operational
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Post-crisis South Asia component of policy may be summed up in a single phrase -easy money and fiscal stimuli. On the monetary policy front the repo rate was reduced in a succession of steps from the level of 9 per cent in September 2008 to 5 per cent in March 2009 (with a corresponding reduction in the reverse repo rate from 6 to 3.5 per cent), the cash reserve ratio (CRR) was also reduced from 9 to 5 per cent over the same period, whereas the statutory liquidity ratio (SLR) was brought down by 1-24 per cent. Altogether, it has been estimated that these measures released more than Rs. 400,000 crores (US$80 billion approximately) of liquidity into the system. There were also three successive fiscal stimuli packages amounting to a total of Rs. 80,100 cores (US$16.3 billion). By and large, the fiscal stimuli did succeed in restoring growth to its pre-crisis trajectory. Real GDP at factor cost rebounded smartly to 8.0 per cent in 2009-2010 and then firmed up further to 8.6 per cent in (see RBI, 2011 . Apart from ensuring adequate liquidity for the uninterrupted supply of credit to the productive sectors of the economy, the RBI also undertook a number of prudential measures aimed at containing financial contagion risks. The latter included guidelines relating to minimum holding periods and minimum retention requirements for securitized products, augmenting provisioning cushions, countercyclical capital buffers, etc. All these measures have been reasonably successful in insulating the Indian economy from the worst consequences of the crisis and positioning it firmly back on a high-growth trajectory (see Reddy, 2011; Subbarao, 2010) 
II. Pakistan
Monetary policy in Pakistan is directed at the achievement of the dual objectives of promoting economic growth and maintaining price stability. To achieve these goals the Central Bank of Pakistan targets monetary aggregates -broad money supply growth as an intermediate target and reserve money as an operational target -in accordance with the projections of GDP growth and inflation (State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), 2007). The Pakistani financial system has also witnessed some progress in terms of product innovation and diversification of monetary management tools. The behaviour of the Pakistani economy has been somewhat atypical set against the background of high growth and low inflation in the rest of the region. While most South Asian economies (led by India) witnessed relatively high-growth rates, Pakistan's economic growth has been particularly low both in the 1990s (the rate averaged 3.2 in the period of [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] as well as more recently. Simultaneously inflationary pressures have been high. These trends are substantially attributable to various structural and political problems plaguing the country in recent years, which began with the government getting embroiled in a judicial crisis in March 2007. These problems were further aggravated by the assassination of Benazir Bhutto and the uneasy transition from a military to a civilian government. The resultant political instability shelved important macroeconomic decisions involving adjustments to key international developments (such as the sharp increases in global oil and commodity prices in 2007 and the subsequent 192 SAJGBR 1,2 prolonged recession in the country's OECD trading partners) (see Hussain, 2009; Faruqi, 2008) . Thus Pakistan's economic circumstances at the inception of the global financial crisis were very different from most South Asian economies (with the possible exception of Sri Lanka). (Table I) .
III. Bangladesh
The Bangladesh economy characterized by low-economic growth and volatile inflation in the 1970s and 1980s showed distinct signs of improvement in the 1990s. Two major factors, namely, a relatively stable political system and economic reform seem to have played a critical role in the stabilization of inflation and the raising of the trend growth rate. In the process, the central bank has emerged as a credible entity, entrusted with multiple objectives (Bangladesh . In recent years, the concept of economic growth has been broadened to encompass "inclusive growth", with a special emphasis on small-and medium-sized enterprise and agriculture growth (as can be seen from various monetary policy statements of the Bangladesh Bank). Nevertheless, the central bank continues to apply traditional tools to target high-powered money and credit in pursuit of its monetary objectives (see Bangladesh Bank, 2011) .
In the absence of capital account convertibility and the very limited exposure to credit derivatives and foreign exchange products of financial institutions, the economy was well insulated from financial contagion and the central bank was thus not required to shift its monetary policy stance in the wake of the crisis. Following the collapse of
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Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the equity prices were affected adversely for a brief period, but the liquidity conditions as well as interest rates remained stable. The economy's resilience in the midst of the crisis was reflected in several macro-variables -GDP growth did not decline markedly; export earnings grew 7 and 12 per cent, respectively, in 2008 and 2009 (largely due to the surge in demand for low-end apparel products) and private consumption (constituting about 75 per cent of the GDP) expanded 5.5 and 6 per cent, respectively, in 2009 (EIU database) . Bangladesh is also notably one of the few South Asian economies that faced relatively little pressure on its balance of payment during the crisis, despite the fact that the country's terms of trade had deteriorated sharply since [2007] [2008] . The balance of payments also drew support from the fact that the growth of remittance flows (constituting nearly 10 per cent of GDP) was buoyant even in the midst of the crisis. However, the growth of remittances began to decelerate in 2010 owing to the economic downturn in the Middle East.
To offset the fall in demand for non-apparel exports, two fiscal packages worth 0.6 and 0.9 per cent of GDP were announced in April and June 2009 (Hayashi, 2009) . As far as monetary action is concerned, the Bangladesh Bank's policy continued to be contractionary as inflation continued to persist and was the major policy goal throughout [2007] [2008] . The central bank adjusted its policy rates upward in September 2008 and again in November 2008 to rein in rising inflation.
To sum-up, the impact of the crisis on the Bangladesh economy was minimal compared to the impact on other South Asian economies. A favourable external position and fiscal space allowed the government to inject two stimulus packages that helped maintain overall stability in the economy. As Tables I and II 
IV. Sri Lanka
The macro-economic management in Sri Lanka during the crisis has been more challenging than in most South Asian economies (barring Pakistan). Largely as a reflection of the civil strife expenditure that the government has had to finance for decades, macro-economic stability in the country has been fragile both on account of the twin deficits (fiscal and current account) and high levels of inflation. While reform in fiscal management is the central focus of Sri Lankan macro-policy, some efforts are also in evidence towards reorienting monetary policy. The multiplicity of objectives of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka has given way to the twin objectives of economic growth and price stability. The monetary policy framework continues to be based on monetary targeting, with reserve money as the operating target (Central Bank of Sri Lanka Limited (CBSL), 2010).
As skyrocketing inflation was a major threat to Sri Lanka's macro-economic stability, the central bank put reserve money growth on a tight leash until the thirdquarter of 2008. This trend had to be reversed in the last quarter of 2008, following the massive shortfall of net foreign assets owing to the outflow of foreign funds as a fallout of the global crisis. GDP growth contracted marginally to 6 per cent in 2008 and significantly to 3. change in its monetary stance (from a contractionary to an expansionary mode) beginning October 2008 by cutting interest rates, extending greater access to banks and primary dealers for central bank repurchases and reducing the statutory reserve ratio (CBSL, 2010) . It also intervened in the foreign exchange market, augmenting dollar liquidity and further enhanced the domestic rupee liquidity via purchase of treasury bills. Even though the fiscal space in Sri Lanka was severely constrained, two stimulus packages equivalent to 0.4 and 0.2 per cent of the country's GDP were injected to contain the external shocks in December 2008 and May 2009, respectively (Hayashi, 2009) .
The Sri Lankan economy has managed to recover smartly from the global crisis. Exports witnessed a 5.8 per cent growth in 2010 and gross fixed investment that had stagnated at around 24 per cent of GDP for many years shot up to 28 per cent. Perhaps, most importantly, the end of the decade-long ethnic conflict is expected to give a significant boost to the economy. Consequently, the economy is projected to expand at 7.6 per cent in 2010 (Table I) .
Global crisis and Southeast Asia
In this section we briefly discuss how key Southeast Asian economies -Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam -were affected by the crisis, their policy responses and the state of recovery. There are several points of comparative interest in the differential impact of the global crisis on South Asia and Southeast Asia. First, in view of the greater global integration of Southeast Asia the transmission effects of the trade channel were considerably more pronounced than in the South Asian case. The worst affected economies were those that relied most strongly on manufacturing exports to industrial countries and included Singapore, the Philippines and Cambodia. However, the sharp depreciations in domestic currency in the wake of massive capital outflows (see Table IV ), acted as a moderating influence on the current account deficit.
Another important transmission channel in the Southeast Asian region was the consumption channel -in most countries of the region, the channel operated via the wealth effect as stock markets plummeted sharply (by more than 50 per cent as compared to their pre-crisis levels, in Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam and the Philippines and by between 30 to 40 per cent in Malaysia and Singapore) and in the case of primary commodity exporters like Indonesia, the decline in international commodity prices acted as a further aggravating factor. The sharp fall in capital market prices along with the reversal of capital flows also depressed investment prospects in most of these countries. By contrast, the limited exposure of financial institutions of this region to toxic assets, as well as the various macro-prudential measures put into effect immediately following the Asian crisis, had the salutary effect of containing the financial transmission channel.
Almost all countries of this region experienced steep declines in inflation rates in 2009, from their moderate to high levels in 2008 (see Table II ). Such a steep fall raised fears of a general deflation in the region, but also gave much greater scope for easy monetary policy and large fiscal stimuli in the region as compared to South Asia. An additional factor affording greater fiscal space were the relatively low levels of the government debt-to-GDP ratios prevailing in most countries of this region (Singapore being somewhat of an exception) around the time of the crisis eruption (2008 Table V) .
As in most other countries, simultaneous actions to contain the consequences of the crisis were initiated on three fronts, namely, monetary easing, fiscal stimuli and macro-prudential regulation.
On the monetary policy front, key policy interest rates were significantly reduced (by 300 basis points (bps), in Indonesia, 100 bps in Thailand, 150 bps in Malaysia and 700 bps in Vietnam). As Singapore operates an exchange-rate centred monetary policy (leaving interest rates and money supply to be freely determined by market forces), the liquidity easing was effected by adopting a target of zero appreciation in October 2008 and lowering the centre of the band in April 2009. Other monetary policy measures included: liquidity assistance in local currency (Indonesia and the Philippines); lending foreign exchange (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore); expanding deposit insurance (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore); bank capital injection (Thailand); imposing restrictions on short sales (Indonesia and Thailand); and relaxation of mark-to-market rules (Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines) (see Asian Development Bank, 2010) ( Table III) .
The fiscal stimuli injected in South Asia and Southeast Asia are indicated in Table VI . In Indonesia, the government adopted a fiscal stimulus amounting to 1.4 per cent of GDP in 2009, but there was an additional stimulus in the form of the election expenditures, which according to some estimates could have been as high as 1 per cent of the country's GDP. The government of Thailand intervened with two fiscal stimulus packages worth over US$45 billion (over 6 per cent of the country's GDP) spread over three successive fiscal years, while the Malaysian Government introduced two fiscal packages totalling US$18.1 billion (about 9 per cent of the GDP). A fiscal stimulus totalling US$14.7 billion (4 per cent of the country's GDP) was launched in Singapore in the second half of 2008. To limit the crisis impact, the Philippine Government injected US$7 billion in the economy through various fiscal outlays (4 per cent of the country's GDP). Finally, in spite of a weak fiscal position, the Vietnamese Government Post-crisis South Asia meltdown of the late 1990s. Hence many countries of this region had fenced in their financial systems with appropriate prudential regulations. These were further strengthened in the wake of the current global crisis. Three types of macro-prudential measures may be distinguished, namely, first, price-and quantity-based measures designed to limit credit expansion such as credit ceilings and exposure limits (these measures were relied upon heavily by all the countries in Southeast Asia); second, measures aimed at quality of loans such as loan-to-value ratios, debt-to-income rules, limits on currency mismatches, etc. (resorted to with varying degrees of emphasis, in Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore); and finally, measures targeting the resilience of the overall banking system to balance sheet shocks, including capital adequacy (beyond that imposed by Basel II), provisioning requirements, etc. (used primarily in Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam) ( Table IV) .
The combination of these measures allowed Southeast Asia to successfully weather the most severe consequences of the crisis. The region had staged a sharp V-shaped recovery by 2010 and (with the notable exception of Vietnam) this recovery was not accompanied by an inflationary surge as was characteristic of the South Asian recovery (Tables V and VI).
Regulatory and supervisory response to the global crisis in South Asia
The global crisis precipitated an extensive debate on the role of national regulatory and supervisory authorities in crisis prevention and crisis management and a number of reports from various international agencies have been forthcoming. Two reports in particular may be viewed as representative of the general trend of thinking on these and related issues, namely, those put forth by the De Larosiere Group (2009) A. Scope of R&S It was felt that R&S has not only to be strengthened but that its scope also needs to be extended considerably. For strengthening R&S three measures seem to be in order, namely:
A1: entrusting a special regulatory authority (either an existing one or a newly constituted one) with an explicit financial stability mandate. Traditionally, the central banks of most countries have been primarily entrusted with the mandate of monetary stability (inflation targeting). However, the recent global crisis, has demonstrated that monetary stability need not imply financial stability (see e.g. Borio, 2011; Galati and Moessner, 2011) . Considerations of financial stability can be taken care of, either by expanding the mandate of the central bank to additionally include financial stability; or establishing a separate regulatory authority explicitly focused on financial stability.
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SAJGBR 1,2 A2: ensuring coordination between different regulatory authorities. Any modern economy is characterized by a diversity of financial institutions, each under a different R&S authority (by way of example, in India, the RBI regulates and supervises operations of commercial and cooperative banks, the National Housing Bank is the R&S authority for housing finance and mortgage companies, the Securities and Exchange Board of India oversees the functioning of equity and bond markets, etc.). Jurisdictional conflicts (often referred to as "turf wars") among such distinct R&S authorities are common and hence the need for inter-regulatory coordination.
A3: expanding the scope of regulation to include credit rating agencies and private pools of capital (including hedge funds) via a system of registration, disclosure requirements and oversight.
B. Leverage of financial institutions
An important amplification factor for the current crisis has been not only the high degree of leveraging of many financial institutions but also the fact that this leveraging has very often been quite opaque. Reflecting the need for more accurate measures of balance sheet exposures, the following suggestions have emerged:
B1: a stronger focus by regulators on loan-to-value ratios (especially for mortgages). B2: higher loan-loss provisioning norms. B3: stress-testing exercises to be conducted periodically to monitor leveraging on an on-going basis. B4: improved disclosure requirements for complex structured products.
C. Pro-cyclicality of capital requirements A fact well known to economists (see e.g. Ghosh and Nachane, 2003) and policymakers alike is the fact of capital adequacy requirements being pro-cyclical and hence a possible accentuating factor in any crisis. As the current crisis runs its course, there is a greater realization among central bankers globally that ways had to be found to counter this pro-cyclicality? Two operational suggestions have been made in this context: C1: requiring financial institutions to build-up capital buffers during economic expansions (which could then be unwound in times of recession) and control, leverage and maturity mismatches (see Hanson et al., 2011; Gordy and Howells, 2009, etc .) C2: imposing higher capital requirements on systemically important financial institutions (see Pennacchi, 2010; Bullard et al., 2009, etc.) .
D. Reducing cost of financial failures
The welfare costs of financial crises are generally severe and fall disproportionately on disadvantaged groups in any society and the current crisis is hardly an exception. With a view to reducing such costs, the following suggestions have been made: D1: an early warning diagnostic system can contribute considerably towards containing collateral damage. D2: the instituting of orderly closure rules for important financial institutions (as prevalent in the USA for banks under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act and Competitive Equality Banking Act). D3: under exceptionally turbulent circumstances, the use of credit ratings by private agencies could be temporarily suspended in favour of regulators' ratings.
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Post-crisis South Asia D4: the establishment of clearing houses in over the counter (OTC) derivatives markets.
E. Devising market incentives for prudent behaviour
Market incentives can play an important supplementary role in ensuring prudent behaviour by financial institutions. It is generally recognized that an important triggering factor in the current crisis has been the unregulated corporate compensation framework, which provided perverse incentives for excessive risk taking resulting in a serious moral hazard syndrome. The solutions to this problem emerging in the deliberations of the Working Group 1 of the G20 are:
E1: prudential oversight of financial executive compensation schemes. E2: originators of securitized products be required to take an equity slice in the products that they sell/distribute. E3: better separation of ratings and consultancy activities of credit rating agencies.
It is not our contention here that the above schemata constitutes a perfect recipe for insurance against future crises. However, it cannot be denied that the schemata could serve as a useful benchmark for evaluating the degree of preparedness of any national system to deal with an incumbent financial crisis. To quote Borio (2011, p. 12 ) "the international community has strongly endorsed the need to establish frameworks" (FSF, 2009; Larosiere group, 2009; G20, 2009 . International regulatory bodies have been strengthening the macro prudential orientation of their standards, national and supranational bodies have been setting up new bodies with explicit macro prudential responsibilities and a lot of work is under way to establish how best to implement the arrangements. Monitoring and limiting systemic risk is now a core policy objective". A number of measures along these lines had already been incepted in several Asian economies well before the crisis, while some others were put in place in the immediate aftermath of the crisis. Table VII examines in detail the extent to which the current South Asian financial regulatory structure measures up to these benchmark criteria. The table clearly indicates that the financial regulatory and supervisory system in South Asia performs fairly well against these general guideposts for financial stability, though the Indian system measures up significantly better than the other countries of the region.
The issue of market discipline was brought into the forefront of debates on sound regulatory practices by the great emphasis laid on it by Basel II. By way of background, it may be mentioned that the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) announced the Basel I accord in 1988, suggesting guidelines for regulation of internationally active banks. The recommendations are not binding on member countries, although most countries have found them useful and adopted them in the interests of making their financial systems compliant with internationally accepted norms. Basel II, which was fully operationalized in 2004, went considerably beyond Basel I. At the current juncture, most OECD countries and major EMEs have already implemented Basel II, while many advanced countries are well on their way to adopt Basel III, which was put out by the BIS in 2011. As is well known, Basel II comprises three pillars, namely, minimum capital requirements (Pillar I); supervisory review of bank operations by the R&S authority (Pillar II); and market discipline (Pillar III). Market discipline is a generic term referring to the monitoring of financial institutions by market participants and in the Basel II schemata, is sought to be achieved by imposing various kinds of disclosure requirements on financial institutions (most Monitoring of banks and financial institutions by depositors in India is weak, primarily because of the prevalent flat-rate deposit insurance premium, which imposes a uniform premium on deposit insurance for all banks, irrespective of the riskiness of their respective loan and investment portfolios. Such a system subsidizes high risk, poorly run institutions at the cost of well-run institutions. An ideal deposit insurance premium pricing system would embody banks paying premium indexed to their own levels of risks; and a premium level that ensures a continually solvent insurance fund (see e.g. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004) . However, it is difficult to assess individual banks' risks accurately, before problems emerge. Thus risk-based premium (RBP) systems should be viewed as a complement to, rather than a substitute for, other methods of checking excessive risk taking like risk-based capital requirement prescriptions, strong supervision and direct restraints on risky activities. There is an increasing move towards RBP across the globe and moving towards an RBP system could be an important move in the direction of strengthening market discipline in India. Interestingly, the Bangladesh Bank has recently approved the new risk-based premium rate and the amount of coverage, which will come into force after the government's approval. So far as the other two South Asian countries are concerned, Sri Lanka has a flat (risk-unadjusted) deposit premium system as in India, whereas in Pakistan deposit insurance has been introduced very recently via the Deposit Protection Fund Act (2008) .
Monitoring of banks by shareholders traditionally occurs via responses of equity values to changes in the perceived risks of banks. If market discipline is effective in improving bank governance, then we must have publicly listed banks (with constantly available market signals from their equity and bond prices) assuming less risk than similarly placed non-publicly traded banks. There have been several empirical tests of this and similar hypotheses (see e.g. Kwan, 2002; Flannery, 2001; Park and Peristiani, 2007) . While the empirical conclusions vary somewhat, nevertheless there seems to be a fairly broad consensus around two propositions: lack of a significant difference in the risk profile between publicly traded and non-traded banks; and publicly traded banks often tend to have worse supervisory ratings than non-publicly traded banks.
One additional way to strengthen market discipline is via the so-called Chicago Fed Plan (see Keehn, 1989) , which proposes the inclusion of a mandatory subordinated debt (i.e. debt that is unsecured and has lower order of claims than other debts in the event of closure (of a company)) component in bank capital requirements (see also, Calomiris and Powell, 2000; Evanoff and Wall, 2002, etc.) . Interestingly subordinated debt can act as an important market disciplining factor, since as perceived risks of a bank increase, holders of subordinated liabilities will require a higher return to compensate for the extra perceived risk. Several studies ( Jagtiani and Lemieux, 2001; Evanoff and Wall, 2002; Sironi, 2003, etc.) have noted that issuance and secondary market risk premia on traded subordinated debt are correlated positively with risk measures such as asset portfolio composition, credit ratings, probability of undercapitalization and/or failure, etc. In India, as in other South Asian countries, as of now, there is no mandatory requirement for subordinate debt and it is a suggestion worth careful consideration as to whether such a mandatory requirement be imposed in the interests of market discipline.
Conclusions
The main focus of this paper has been on how the South Asian region has been affected by one of the worst crisis in recent decades and what lessons can be drawn for EMEs
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Post-crisis South Asia from this experience. We have seen that this region has coped well given the severity of the crisis -certainly countries in this region have managed to stave off contagion to their financial systems, though in the initial stages the real sector was badly affected through declining trade volumes, capital outflows and exchange rate volatility. A trilateral combination of monetary easing, fiscal stimuli and macro-prudential measures was instrumental in guarding the countries of the region against the looming recessionary threats. We describe the details of this process in the case of four South Asian countries, namely, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka in Section 2.
It is of considerable interest to juxtapose the South Asian experience with the experience in Southeast Asia which is far more integrated globally in terms of trade, investment and financial flows. This comparison along with a somewhat quick overview of the unfolding of the crisis and its aftermath in Southeast Asia forms the subject matter of Section 3. Interesting similarities as well as contrasts emerge. The impact on Southeast Asia was far more severe (as its greater global integration would lead us to expect), but the recovery was correspondingly quicker. Among other things, lower base line (pre-crisis) inflation and greater fiscal space, afforded relatively more comfortable room for monetary easing and fiscal stimuli and this prompted the V-shaped recovery. Post-crisis the situation appears fairly sanguine in both regions, though inflation is emerging as a major threat, especially in South Asia. Another major post-crisis problem confronting the Asian region has been massive capital inflows, as the slow recovery in the EU and the USA meant that a large part of the liquidity released by the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve Bank has wended its way to the Asian region. Here also the South Asian response has been somewhat different from the Southeast Asian case. None of the countries in South Asia has experimented with capital controls, though these have not been explicitly ruled out. In Southeast Asia, by contrast, three economies, namely, Vietnam, Indonesia and Thailand have introduced some varieties of capital controls.
The global crisis has also brought to the fore the dangers associated with regulatory and supervisory lapses. The extensive debates on these issues has slowly generated a nascent consensus among central banks, finance ministries and multilateral institutions relative to the desiderata for national regulatory and supervisory systems, if they were to be successful in maintaining systemic financial stability. The existing post-crisis regulatory architecture in South Asia, when benchmarked against these desiderata comes out reasonably well, which of course makes for a sense of satisfaction, though hardly for complacency (Section 4).
In a similar fashion, the crisis has highlighted the inconsistencies in regulatory systems across countries and the potential conflicts of interest between regulators across borders as well as between regulators and financial markets. A new era of global financial coordination to deal with global systemic risk seems to be dawning. But this will have to contend with four formidable and fundamental issues, namely, first, the coordination of regulations; second, coordination of resolution tools; third, coordination in depositor and investor protection; and finally, enhanced information sharing. A beginning can be made by ushering in an era of South-South financial coordination in the Asian region.
The future success of financial reforms in South Asia as well as Southeast Asia, will be crucially contingent upon how successfully the regulatory architecture in these regions adapts to the twin dictates of financial development and financial stability, the 204 SAJGBR 1,2
